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UNITED STATES SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE
PANAMA CANAL ZONE
INTRODUCTION
On February 7, 1974, the United States and the Republic of
Panama reached agreement on a number of joint principles to
serve as guidelines for the negotiation of a new canal treaty.'
These principles were the culmination of ten years of diplomacy;
it was also an attempt to supplant the 1903 Convention with
Panama for the Construction of a Ship Canal [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Treaty of 1903].2 The joint principles embodied four
substantive changes from the original treaty: 1) the length of
the term should be reduced from perpetuity to a fixed termina-
tion date; 2) a substantial part of the Canal Zone should be re-
turned to Panama; 3) rental payments from the United States
to Panama should be greatly increased; and 4) Panama should
be granted a role in the administration of the Canal.'
Until recently, the United States adhered to the position that
the Treaty of 1903 ceded sovereignty over the Canal and Canal
Zone to the United States.' Although the executive branch has
modified its stance,5 Congress still staunchly maintains the view
that the United States does, in fact, govern the Canal Zone as
sovereign.' Shortly after the 1974 Kissinger-Tack Agreement
1. The joint principles agreed to by the United States and Panama subsequently
served as the basis for three conceptual agreements that specifically dealt with the deli-
cate issues of sovereignty and control in the Canal Zone. See 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121
CONG. REC. H 9662 (1975). See also 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 181 (1974) for the text of the
joint principles on which the contextual agreements were based.
2. Convention With Panama for the Construction of a Ship Canal, signed Nov. 18,
1903, 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. No. 431 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of 1903]. The Treaty of 1903
is also referred to as the Bunau-Varilla-Hay Treaty.
3. See 70 DEP'T STATE BULL., supra note 1, at 184.
4. See text accompanying notes 26-28 infra.
5. See 73 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 1 (1975).
6. The prevailing congressional view was expressed by Rep. Daniel Flood of Pennsyl-
vania:
Though the problems of the Panama Canal may appear highly complicated yet
when reduced to their essentials they are relatively brief and simple. The crucial
facts are: First. Under the 1903 Treaty, which was authorized by the Congress -
Spooner Act of 1902 [32 Stat. 481] the United States acquired full sovereign
rights, power, and authority over the Canal Zone in perpetuity for the construc-
tion, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of the Panama Canal
in accordance with the rules governing the operation of the Suez Canal.
The Canal Zone is not a "leased" area, as so often misstated in the press and
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was signed, Senator Thurmond introduced a resolution which
reasserted the Senate position that the United States should
retain "undiluted sovereignty" over the Canal Zone.7 In the
House of Representatives, the Snyder Amendment to an appro-
priations bill directed that "none of the funds appropriated in
this title shall be used for the purpose of negotiating the sur-
render or relinquishment of any United States rights in the
Panama Canal Zone." 8 These measures have received bipartisan
support. Since both houses of Congress must consent to treaties
by a majority vote9 and the power to regulate or dispose of prop-
erty belonging to the United States resides with Congress, 10 the
current negotiations may well be an exercise in futility.
This note examines the Treaty of 1903 to determine what
rights it granted to the United States. Additionally, the congres-
sional view that United States sovereignty over the Canal and
Canal Zone is strategically essential will be analyzed to deter-
mine whether United States interests are best served by this posi-
tion.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1846, the United States acknowledged Colombian sover-
eignty over Panama as the quid pro quo for Colombian agreement
that a canal should be built." Subsequent negotiations resulted
in the Hay-Hurran Treaty,'2 which was rejected by the Colom-
bian Senate.' 3 The chief objection to the proposed treaty was that
it provided compensation which was not commensurate with the
right to build the canal. Other provisions of the treaty would have
granted the United States a zone ten kilometers wide, a one-
in reference works, but a grant in perpetuity under our full sovereign rights,
power and authority and, in fact, constitutionally acquired domain of the
United States.
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. H10417 (1975).
7. 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 Cong. Rec. S4730 (1974).
8. 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. H8121 (1975).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
10. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
11. Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation and -Commerce with New Granada
[Colombia], Dec. 12, 1846, 9 Stat. 881, T.S. No. 54.
12. S. Doc. No. 474, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 277, 279 (1914). See also Telegram from Mr.
Beaupr6 to Mr. Hay, [1903] FOR. REL. U.S. 179; N. PADELFORD, THE PANAMA CANAL IN
PEACE AND WAR 21-22 (1942); M. DUVAL, CADIZ TO CATHAY: THE STORY OF THE LONG
DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE FOR THE PANAMA CANAL 380 (2d ed. 1947); S.Doc. No. 456, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 277 (1914).
13. Telegram from Mr. Beaupre to Mr. Hay, [1903] FOR. REL. U.S. 222.
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hundred year lease, and concurrent jurisdiction and power in the
Canal Zone.
Shortly after Colombian disapproval of the treaty terms,
Panamanian nationalists revolted and declared their independ-
ence from Colombia. The United States immediately stationed
the U.S.S. Nashville in the port city of Colon as a warning to
Colombia not to intervene." Three days later, the United States
officially recognized the fledgling republic,15 and within two
weeks the Treaty of 1903 was signed. In return for a guarantee
that the United States would protect the independence of the new
republic 6 and pay an annuity for the rights granted,'7 Panama
agreed to United States "use, occupation and control of a zone
of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance,
operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width of
ten miles extending to the distance of five miles on each side of
the center line of the route of the Canal to be constructed."'
8
The terms of the Treaty of 1903 were far more favorable to
the United States than those of the Hay-Hurran Treaty which
had been rejected by the Colombian Senate. Although the mone-
tary compensation was equivalent, the treaty with Panama
provided that: 1) the Canal Zone was widened from ten kilome-
ters to ten miles; 2) the grant was to be in perpetuity instead of
a one-hundred year lease; 3) the United States was given exclu-
sive jurisdiction within the Canal Zone and a right of eminent
domain over land outside it, rather than concurrent jurisdiction;
and 4) the United States obtained the right to maintain order in
two principal Panamanian cities if the Republic of Panama
should become incapable of doing so.
There have been two major amendments to the original
treaty. In 1936,1' the annuity was raised and the United States
relinquished both the right to exercise eminent domain and the
14. See Hoyt, Law and Politics in the Revision of Treaties Affecting the Panama
Canal, 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 289, 299-300 (1965).
15. Id. at 299.
16. Treaty of 1903 at art. I.
17. Treaty of 1903 at art. XIV.
18. Treaty of 1903 at art. II.
19. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Panama, Mar. 2, 1936, 53 Stat. 1807,
T.S. No. 945. This treaty provided that the Canal Zone constituted "territory of the
Republic of Panama under the jurisdiction of the United States of America" but the
provision has been interpreted by the United States as being of limited significance since
it only referred to the landing of passengers and cargo. Id., art. In, para. 6. See [1939]
FOR. REL. U.S., vol. V, 750.
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right to take action outside the Canal Zone. Additionally, the
grant in perpetuity was limited to property inside the Canal
Zone. A second amendment," in 1955, further increased the an-
nuity and also relinquished title to property which the United
States held outside the Canal Zone. In 1964, an agreement was
reached between the United States and Panama to adjust the
rights of each State in the Canal Zone, but it failed to win Con-
gressional ratification.2
I1. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE CANAL ZONE: TREATY INTERPRETATION
Support for Panama's claim to partial jurisdiction over the
Canal Zone can be based upon the rules of treaty interpretation.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Vienna Convention]2 is the last in a series of interna-
tional conventions which started with the 1928 Convention on
Treaties adopted by the Sixth International Conference of Ameri-
can States.23 Although not applied retroactively,24 the provisions
of the Vienna Convention which are considered in this note are
common to all of these conventions on treaty interpretation and
are generally accepted as customary international law.
25
Textual Analysis
The question of sovereignty over the Canal Zone was in dis-
pute as soon as the ink on the Treaty of 1903 was dry. Its interpre-
tation was impeded by the ambiguous terms used to define the
interests that the United States obtained and Panama relin-
quished. The United States has always maintained that Panama
retained nothing more than "titular" sovereignty over the terri-
tory. Although Panama was still dependent upon United States
20. Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation with Panama, Jan. 25, 1955,
T.I.A.S. No. 3297, 6 U.S.T. 2273.
21. 113 CONG. REC. 18942 (1967).
22. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. The text of the
Vienna Convention may also be found at 8 INT'L LEG. MAT'S 679 (1969); 63 AM. J. INT'L
L. 875 (1969). See also S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: GUIDE TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF VIENNA CONVENTION (1970).
23. For the text of this convention see IV HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 2378
(1971); see also Harvard Research Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L
L. 653 (Supp. 1935); McDougal, The International Law Commission's Draft Articles Upon
Interpretation: Textuality Redivivus, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 992 (1967).
24. Vienna Convention at art. 9.
25. See M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1 (1973).
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protection from Colombian invasion, as early as 1904 Panama
denied that the treaty implied either cession of territory or abso-
lute transfer of sovereignty to the United States. In a letter to the
United States Secretary of State, Panama's Foreign Minister
concluded:
My Government considers that the idea of the contracting par-
ties is obscure in everything relating to these delicate questions
of dominion and sovereignty; but after a careful study the con-
clusion may be arrived at that the two countries exercise con-
jointly the sovereignty over the territory of the canal zone, and
that in the cases expressly specified in the . . . Treaty [of 1903]
the use of such right belongs to the United States by virtue of
delegation from the Republic of Panama, but in all that con-
cerning which the treaty is silent the rights of the Republic of
Panama remain unalterable and complete.2
The claim of coequal sovereignty was a bold assertion in light of
the relationship between Panama and the United States in 1904.
Secretary of State Hay, in his reply, did not deny the "titular"
sovereignty of Panama over the Canal Zone, but called it "noth-
ing more than a barren scepter."27 Two years later, Secretary of
War Taft affirmed United States recognition of the "titular" sov-
ereignty of Panama over the Canal Zone, while expressing the
opinion that its sole significance lay in its psychological effect. 8
It is clear from these early exchanges that the United States
obtained something less than actual sovereignty over the Canal
Zone. Precisely what the United States received can only be as-
certained through interpretation of the Treaty of 1903.
The Vienna Convention contains the fundamental principle
that a treaty should be "interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."" This
does not preclude contextual factors from consideration. Article
31 directs that such contextual factors include the preamble and
annexes of the document, related agreements made by all parties
and instruments made by less than all parties, subsequent prac-
26. Letter from Mr. de Obaldla, Minister of Panama, to Mr. Hay, Secretary of State,
[19041 FOR. RaL. U.S. 598, 602.
27. Letter from Mr. Hay to Mr. de Obaldia, [1904] FOR. RE.. U.S. 613, 615.
28. Woolsey, The Sovereignty of the Panama Canal Zone, 20 Am. J. INT'L L. 117, 121
(1926). See also Note, Legal Aspects of the Panama Canal Zone-In Perspective, 45 B.U.L.
REv. 64, 71-72 (1964).
29. Vienna Convention at art. 31, § 1.
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tice establishing agreements, and relevant rules of international
law." Article 32 provides for supplementary means of interpreta-
tion,
including preparatory work on the treaty and the circumstances
of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from
the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when
the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the mean-
ing ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is mani-
festly absurd or unreasonable.'
The body of the Treaty of 1903 is vague with regard to the
nature of the interest in the Canal Zone that Panama transferred
to the United States. When the preamble and the circumstances
surrounding its signing are examined, however, the limitation
upon United States interests becomes evident. The preamble
specifies that the United States acquired "control of the neces-
sary territory of the Republic of Colombia, and the sovereignty
of such territory being actually vested in the Republic of
Panama."2 This section of the preamble not only recognizes Pan-
amanian sovereignty over the former Colombian territory, but
also clearly relegates the United States interest to control rather
than sovereignty.
The Treaty of 1903 stated that the grant to the United States
was to be in perpetuity, and gave it the power to "possess and
exercise as if it were the sovereign of the territory within which
said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the
exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights,
power or authority."3 The phrase "as if" manifests a desire to
create only the semblance of sovereignty. This phrasing, coupled
with the wording of the preamble to the treaty, indicates that
power, but not dominion, over the Canal Zone was surrendered
by Panama. While it can be argued that the Treaty of 1903
granted the United States exclusive sovereign rights,34 a closer
reading of the language quoted above leads to a different conclu-
sion. The authority to act as sovereign to the exclusion of Panama
refers only to the exercise of sovereign rights in the Canal Zone,
and does not contemplate a transfer of sovereignty itself.
30. Vienna Convention at art. 31, §§ 2 & 3.
31. Vienna Convention at art. 32.
32. Treaty of 1903 at preamble (emphasis added).
33. Treaty of 1903 at art. III (emphasis added).
34. See note 6 supra.
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Moreover, had a transfer of territory and sovereignty been
intended, a less ambiguous mode of expression would have been
employed. Indeed, proximate to the signing of the Treaty of 1903,
the United States signed treaties which were more definite and
certain in their terminology. In cases in which the United States
has acquired undisputed sovereignty over foreign territory the
language of the relevant treaties has clearly indicated that a ces-
sion was intended. Two examples of such acquisitions are Ha-
waii35 and the Virgin Islands.36 The treaty annexing the Hawaiian
Islands to the United States declared:
Whereas the Government of the Republic of Hawaii having in
due form signified its consent, in the manner provided by its
constitution, to cede absolutely and without reserve to the
United States of America all rights of whatsoever kind in and
over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies."
In the treaty which conveyed the Virgin Islands to the United
States, the language employed left no doubt as to sovereignty:
this convention cedes to the United States all territory, domin-
ion and sovereignty possessed, asserted or claimed by Denmark
in the West Indies; . . . Denmark guarantees that the cession
made by the preceeding article is free of encumbrances of any
reservations, privileges, franchises, grants or possessions. .... 1
In all instances where the United States has acquired territory,
the language acknowledging United States sovereignty has been
similarly explicit, usually employing the word "ceded."
From this brief review of the terms of the canal treaty it is
evident that any claim of United States sovereignty over the
Canal Zone is of questionable validity. A further examination of
the Treaty of 1903, in light of the principles of the Vienna Con-
vention, indicates that Panama probably has the right to de-
nounce the treaty and would not be in violation of international
law in insisting that the United States completely remove itself
from the Canal Zone.
35. Joint Resolution to Provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United
States, July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750.
36. Convention between the United States and Denmark for cession of the Danish
West Indies, Aug. 4, 1916, 39 Stat. 1706.
37. 30 Stat. 750.
38. 39 Stat. 1706.
[Vol. 11:2
PANAMA CANAL ZONE
Contextual Analysis: Panama's Right of Denunciation
The Vienna Convention recognizes the right of a nation to
denounce a treaty it has made under certain circumstances.
1. A treaty which contains no provisions regarding its termina-
tion which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is
not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless:
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied
by the nature of the treaty. 9
Subsection (b) of this article was added due to the belief that the
"character of the treaty" may admit of a right to denounce by
implication." Because the nature of the Panamanian government
at the time of signing makes the character of the Treaty of 1903
questionable, Panama may have such an implied right of denun-
ciation.
The brief interval between the declaration of Panamanian
independence and the signing of the Treaty of 1903 places in issue
the free judgment of Panama's representatives since its inde-
pendence from Colombia was uncertain. The continued existence
of Panama as a nation was primarily due to the stationing of the
U.S.S. Nashville in the City of Colon as a deterrent to Colombian
intervention.4 One commentator has stated that
the revolt of Panama on November 3, 1903 was instigated and
financed by agents of the French canal company, and the con-
spirators counted entirely on prompt intervention by the United
States. Actual collusion was never proved, but the administra-
tion in Washington was aware of the conspiracy and ready to
take advantage of it.4
An even greater cloud is placed upon the legitimacy of the
incipient Panamanian government because the new Foreign Min-
ister, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, was a French engineer who had
previously served as an agent for the canal company.43 Article 50
of the Vienna Convention states that
[i]f the expression of a States' consent to be bound by a treaty
39. Vienna Convention at art. 56.
40. See T. EUAs, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 106-07 (1974).
41. See R. BAXTER & D. CARROLL, THE PANAMA CANAL 47 (1965).
42. Hoyt, supra note 14, at 293.
43. Id.
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has been procured through the corruption of its representative
directly or indirectly by another negotiating State, the State
may invoke such corruption as invalidating its consent to be
bound by the treaty.44
The conventions on treaty interpretation have not developed
criteria for determining the precise point in time at which a decla-
ration of independence is effective to establish sovereignty over a
territory and thus create competence to sign a treaty.
It must frequently be a delicate task to determine the precise
moment when the authority of insurgents is sufficient to give
them competence under international law to make treaties on
behalf of the whole state, [in the case of Panama on behalf of a
newly formed state] and when, correspondingly, the authority
of the regularly constituted government is so undermined as to
deprive it of the competence to act validly for the state. It is
conceiveable, but difficult to verify, that in case of doubt, a
residuary rule of international law points to the older govern-
ment as competent to represent the state. 45
It would appear that the competence of a newly emergent State
should be clearly established before it can enter into treaties of
major import. In the case of Panama, only two weeks elapsed
between the revolt against Colombia and the signing of the
Treaty of 1903. The treaty gave the United States rights to a
significant portion of the isthmus of Panama and, in effect, di-
vided the country in half. Under the circumstances, the validity
of a broad surrender of property and authority is questionable,
and the competence of the Panamanian government to surrender
sovereignty is extremely doubtful.
Ill. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PANAMA CANAL ZONE: UNITED STATES
CASE LAW
Soon after the Treaty of 1903 was signed, the United States
Supreme Court reviewed the status that the treaty conferred
upon the Canal Zone. In Wilson v. Shaw," it was held that the
United States could build a canal in Panama because the Treaty
of 1903 granted it title to the Canal Zone which was sufficient to
meet constitutional requirements. The Court stated that "it is
44. Vienna Convention at art. 50.
45. H. Bux, TREATY-MAKING POWER 145-46 (1960).
46. 204 U.S. 24 (1906).
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hypercritical to contend that the title of the United States is
imperfect, and that the territory described does not belong to this
Nation, because of the omission of some of the technical terms
used in ordinary conveyance of real estate."4 The decision in
Wilson is not determinative of the issue of sovereignty however;
the Court refers to United States "title" to the Canal Zone rather
than sovereignty." Such bare title is analogous to holding a deed
to a piece of land and does not support a claim of sovereignty.
Furthermore, when examined in conjunction with later Su-
preme Court cases, the decision of the Court in Wilson clearly
does not stand for the principle that the United States obtained
sovereignty over the Canal Zone for all purposes. In David Kauf-
man & Son Co. v. Smith,49 the Court held that the Canal Zone
was a foreign country for the purpose of the collection of duties,
"in view of the treaty, between the Republic of Panama and the
United States, and the various acts of Congress relating to such
Zone . . ... o In Luckenbach S.S. v. United States," the Court
held that the Immigration Act of 1917,52 which concerns only
foreign ports, was applicable to the ports in the Canal Zone on
the basis of a Labor Department construction of the Immigration
Act.53 In Vermilya Brown Co. Inc. v. Connel,54 the issue posed was
whether the Fair Labor Standards Act5 covered employees in an
area of Bermuda which was under a ninety-nine year lease to the
United States. Respondent argued that the Act was applicable to
areas in which the United States was not sovereign, and specifi-
cally cited the Canal Zone as an example. The Court held that
the Act covered both Bermuda and the Canal Zone.
Where as here the purpose is to regulate labor relations in an
area vital to our national life, it seems reasonable to interpret
its provisions to have force where the nation has sole power,
rather than limit the coverage to sovereignty. Such an interpre-
tation is consonant with the Administrator's inclusion of the
Panama Canal Zone within the meaning of "possession.""
47. Id. at 33.
48. Id.
49. 216 U.S. 610 (1910).
50. Id. at 611.
51. 280 U.S. 173 (1930).
52. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917).
53. 280 U.S. at 182.
54. 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
55. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1938).
56. 335 U.S. at 390.
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In each of these cases, the Court passed upon only the limited
issue of the scope of United States authority. At no time has the
Court unequivocally held that the Canal Zone is sovereign terri-
tory of the United States.
The Court has recognized that "the power to acquire terri-
tory by treaty implies not only the power to govern such territory,
but to prescribe upon what terms the United States should re-
ceive such inhabitants."5 Oppenheim states that
the object of cession is sovereignty over the ceded territory,
[and] all such individuals domiciled thereon as are subjects of
the ceding State become ipso facto by the cession subjects of the
acquiring State. The hardship involved is the fact that in all
cases of cession the inhabitants of the territory who remain lose
their old citizenship and are handed over to a new sovereign
whether they like it or not. .... .1
In previous instances where the United States has obtained sover-
eignty over territory, e.g., Hawaii,59 Alaska,6" Puerto Rico,'
Guam,62 and the Virgin Islands,6 3 the inhabitants have been given
the opportunity to become United States citizens. While under
domestic law the United States may not be compelled to offer
citizenship to resident aliens, the fact that this option was not
offered to residents of the Canal Zone indicates that there is a
special character distinguishing it from other territories. Con-
gress, by its inaction, has tacitly accepted this distinction.
IV. PANAMA'S RIGHT TO NATIONALIZE THE CANAL AND THE CANAL
ZONE UNDER EMERGENT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
United States recognition of Panama's "titular" sovereignty
over the Canal Zone may have been devoid of significance at the
turn of the century, but with the passage of the United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 180364 it attained new import. The
resolution, which the United States voted for, recognized every
57. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 268 (1901).
58. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 551 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955) (foonotes omit-
ted).
59. Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 4, 31 Stat. 141.
60. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 273, 15 Stat. 240.
61. Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191, § 7, 31 Stat. 79.
62. Act of Aug. 1, 1950, ch. 512, § 5, 64 Stat. 385.
63. Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, § 3, 68 Stat. 497.
64. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15 (1962).
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nation's permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and
wealth.
1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the
interest of their national development and of the wellbeing of
the people of the State concerned.
3 .... due care [must] be taken to ensure that there is no
impairment for any reason, of that State's sovereignty over its
natural wealth and resources.65
The Treaty of 1903 represents something less than an absolute
cession of territory. If the Canal Zone is considered a natural
resource, the United States would thus be bound to recognize
Panama's permanent sovereignty pursuant to article 1 of Resolu-
tion 1803.
Panama has long expressed this belief, based upon the
unique geographic features and position of the Panamanian isth-
mus.66 A United States case dealing with the issue of whether
land, per se, can be considered a natural resource lends support
to this view. In Snyder v. Board of Commissioners," it was held
that:
to the extent to which a given area possesses elements or fea-
tures which supply a human need and contribute to the health,
welfare, and benefits of a community, the same constitute natu-
ral resources.6"
As a natural resource, the Canal Zone would be subject to nation-
alization pursuant to Resolution 1803. Nationalization has been
defined as "the act of transferring an economic activity from the
private sector to the public sector."6
The negotiations between the United States and Panama
revolve around transferring the economic interests of the United
States in the Canal Zone.70 Article 3 of Resolution 1803 directs
that economic activity should not impair the State's sovereignty,
65. Id. at 15-16.
66. Letter from Panamanian Minister (Alfero) to the Secretary of State, [1923] FOR.
REL. U.S., vol. II, 638.
67. 125 Ohio St. 336, 181 N.E. 383 (1923).
68. Id. at 339, 181 N.E. 384.
69. Kouatly, Issues in Private Property and Nationalization, 42 INS. COUNCIL J. 386,
394 (1975).
70. See note 66 supra.
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and the operation of the Panama Canal clearly represents a seri-
ous infringement upon Panamanian sovereignty.
Acceptance of the Panamanian demand that a substantial
part of the Canal Zone should be returned to Panama is ulti-
mately in the interest of the United States. If Panama national-
ized the Canal Zone, in whole or part, pursuant to Resolution
1803, it would have to provide the United States with adequate
compensation. The requisite standard for compensation of alien
property is one of the most controversial issues in international
law today.' The orthodox position, usually espoused by the
United States, is that "prompt, adequate and effective" compen-
sation is required, 2 that is, full compensation must be paid
before, or soon after, the taking in the legal currency of the coun-
try whose property was nationalized. Commentators are nearly
unanimous in condemning this position as both unjust and un-
realistic.73 Professors Dawson and Weston consider that "appeals
to this somewhat metaphysical standard of 'prompt, adequate
and effective' compensation are not only unrealistic in light of
extensive foreign wealth deprivations but frustrate efforts to
achieve at least minimum stability of interaction in a world of
violent and radical change. 7 Although no generally accepted
standard of compensation has been so widely adopted as to be
considered customary law, most theories prevalent today link the
standard of compensation to the equities of the situation .7 The
United States could not expect significant compensation for any
Panamanian nationalization if those equities were taken into ac-
count.
71. See generally Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 585 (1960);
Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 243 (1941); Hyde, Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 854 (1956); Katzarov,
The Validity of the Act of Nationalization in International Law, 22 MODERN L. REV. 639
(1959); Kuhn, Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property and its Impact on International
Law, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 709 (1951); Re, The Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property,
36 MINN. L. REV. 323 (1952); Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation, A Comparative
Approach, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 458 (1950); Ujlaki, Compensation for the Nationalization of
American Owned Property in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, 1 N.Y.L.F. 265 (1955).
72. See Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective"; A Universal Standard
of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 727 (1962) for an excellent critical analysis of this
standard.
73. See note 71 supra for commentators who take such a position.
74. See Dawson & Weston, supra note 72, at 757.
75. See Francioni, Compensation for Nationalization of Foreign Property: The Bor-
derland Between Law and Equity, 24 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 225 (1975).
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V. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL
Congressional opponents of a new treaty with Panama which
would entail a lessening of United States power have often as-
serted that continued presence in the Canal Zone is necessary to
protect freedom of passage through the Canal and to promote the
economic interests of the United States in the area." Free access
of United States vessels to the Canal would fulfill such interests.
The United States should take steps to ensure the internation-
alization of the canal, and then negotiate a gradual transition to
full Panamanian sovereignty. 7
It has been argued that such a transfer of control to Panama
would entail a threat to the security interests of the United States
due to the close relationship between the Cuban and Panama-
nian governments. If the transfer is coupled with internation-
alization of the Canal, however, United States military vessels
would have unimpaired access. It is unlikely that a United States
withdrawal from the Canal Zone would ever result in the closing
of the Canal. Panama is economically dependent upon the Canal
for revenue, and the United States is the largest user of the Canal
facilities." Despite political liaisons with Cuba, it would be to
Panama's benefit to keep the Canal open to United States ship-
ping. Furthermore, relinquishment of the Canal and Canal Zone
to Panama would alter the political climate in Latin America and
foster better United States-Panamanian relations.
The Process of Internationalization
Freedom of passage of ships through interoceanic waterways
during both war and peace is firmly established in international
law.79 The Hay-Paunceforte Treaty of 190180 established the prin-
76. See note 6 supra.
77. Internationalization would leave unimpaired the real interests of the
United States, namely, the preservation of the Canal and access to it, good
service at low cost, and a voice in the operation of the Canal. The security of
the Canal would be, if anything, enhanced. Already hopelessly vulnerable, an
internationalized Canal might seem to a potential aggressor a less attractive
target than one under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
Travis & Watkins, Control of the Panama Canal: An Obsolete Shibboleth?, 37 FOR. AFF.
407, 417 (1959).
78. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 601
(1975).
79. As early as 1888 the Convention of Constantinople, a multilateral treaty, guaran-
teed freedom of passage by and for the signatory states - Great Britain, Germany, Austria-
Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, and Turkey. This Convention
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ciple of freedom of passage through the proposed Canal, at least
as between the signatories, the United States and Great Britain.'
The treaty provided that the Canal should be "free and open to
the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations . . . on terms
of entire equality. '8 2 The United States has the power to grant the
rights of navigation to all nations pursuant to the Hay-
Paunceforte Treaty:
The United States may come to believe that she is bound to
allow the free use of the canal and that nations using it, that
they have a right to do so. In that moment the international
community would be endowed with the right to navigate such
as an international canal. . . . The initial stipulation of the
Hay-Paunceforte Treaty in favour of all nations would thus
have been transformed into an international right."
The right to navigate through artificial interoceanic water-
ways such as the Panama Canal has been recognized under inter-
national law. The Permanent Court of International Justice held
that the right existed in the Case of The S.S. Wimbledon.4 In
that case, a British ship carrying munitions to Poland for use in
the Russo - Polish War attempted to pass through the Kiel Canal,
which was controlled by Germany. Both Great Britain and Ger-
many were neutral, and Germany did not wish to jeopardize that
neutrality by allowing arms for belligerent States to pass through
the Canal. The Court held that Germany was required to permit
all vessels to pass through the Canal pursuant to the Treaty of
Versailles,8 5 which stated that the Kiel Canal was to be "free and
provided that States not parties could ratify it and thereby receive its benefits. "A similar
provision in the first text of the Hay-Paunceforte Treaty was rejected by the United States
Senate on the grounds that the United States should not be contractually bound by an
agreement which would create rights and duties as between the United States and third
States." R. BAXTER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS 175 (1964) (citations omitted).
See OPPENHEIM, supra note 58, at 480-81.
80. Treaty with Great Britain to Facilitate the Construction of a Ship Canal, Nov.
18, 1901, 32 Stat. 1903, T.S. No. 401 [hereinafter cited as Hay-Paunceforte Treaty].
81. The motive of the United States in signing this treaty with Great Britain was not
to insure that the Canal remained open to all nations without discrimination. In 1850, the
United States and Great Britain had previously entered into the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
3 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 130 (1906), in which Great Britain gave up claims
to parts of Nicaragua so that the United States could build a canal in Nicaragua. In
return, the United States agreed to stringent limitations, i.e., the right of free passage,
on its authority over any canal built between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Id. at 203.
82. Hay-Paunceforte Treaty, 32 Stat. at 1904.
83. J. OBIETA, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 34 (1960).
84. [19231 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 1.
85. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, done
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open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace
with Germany on terms of entire equality. ' 86 As evidence of cus-
tomary international law requiring interoceanic waterways to be
left open in times of war or peace, the Court cited the position
adhered to by the United States prior to World War I that all
ships be allowed to pass through the Panama Canal.87
Explicit international recognition of the Panama Canal as an
international waterway would necessarily require approval by the
United States and Panama.
The legal status of the waterway is not to be determined by
reference to. . . abstract concepts but by a consideration of the
relations established among Panama, the United States, the
user nations by treaty and by the customary law which state
practice has established for this and similar waterways. In so far
as freedom of passage is concerned, the law governing the Pan-
ama Canal is. . . a general body of canal law, which establishes
rights and duties for the proprietor of the waterway and for the
users. So long as the present regime of the Panama Canal is
maintained, the relation of the operator of the waterway to the
adjacent territorial sovereign is, by contrast, not a question of
general international law but of particular international law
having application to the Republic of Panama and the United
States alone.8 1
The economic interests of the United States would be served
by the internationalization of the Panama Canal. This would
permit both the protection of United States economic interests
and a renewal of the rights which Panama lost in the ambiguous
Treaty of 1903. The United States should accept a partial trans-
fer of power in the Canal Zone on amicable terms, rather than
further strain United States-Panamanian relations. The ques-
tion that opponents to the renegotiation of the Treaty of 1903
should ask is not whether the United States gained sovereignty
over the Canal Zone in 1903, but whether the United States
should assert such claims in the face of vehement Panamanian
opposition. The foreign policy interests of the United States are
best served by rapprochement with Panama.
Howard M. Rubin
June 28, 1919, 112 BRrT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS 1 (1919); 2 Bevans 43.
86. [1923] P.C.I.J. at 24.
87. Id. at 25.
88. Baxter, supra note 79, at 87.
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